NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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THESIS

ROLE AMBIGUITY AND ROLE CONFLICT IN THE AREA OF INDIVIDUAL TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT

by

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June 1983

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Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict in the Area of Individual Tactical Development

by

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requirements for the degree of

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The Navy's primary mission is combat warfare in the defense of our country. To achieve this mission it is vital that naval officers in operational billets assigned to ships, submarines, aircraft squadrons, and afloat staffs maintain the highest degree of readiness and tactical expertise. Analysis of survey data obtained from air warfare officers indicates the existence of role conflict and role ambiguity in the area of individual tactical development. The results showed, in particular, that officers perceived differences in how they, their commands, and the Navy evaluated the importance of officer tactical-skill development.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The Navy's primary mission is combat warfare in the defense of our country. The tactical competence of the Navy's line officer is directly related to the achievement of its mission.

Improving tactical readiness was an issue discussed in meetings held in November and December 1981 attended by the Fleet CINC's, Type Commanders, numbered Fleet Commanders, and other principal operational commanders concerned with tactical development and training. Numerous suggestions for improving tactical readiness and training were proposed to the Chief of Naval Operations during the discussions following the November and December meetings.

In May of 1982, as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward U.S.N. identified one of the major needs of the Navy as improving the tactical proficiency of the fleet. Admiral Hayward had desired to implement a tactics test for Naval Officers. It was Admiral Hayward's intention that the examination on Naval Tactics be required for officers who had been selected for promotion and that the test must be passed before a promotion could occur. The examination was not to influence the process for selecting an officer for promotion, but rather was to be a requirement of a selected officer. At that time it was not determined if the exam would be administered to only line officers or if the examined group would also include Staff Corps Officers (Medical, Dental, Judge Advocate General, Medical Services, Nurse, Supply, Chaplain, Civil Engineer Corps) [Bush, 1982: p. 1].

As a result of recent meetings, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations has directed that a survey be conducted to determine how line officers divide their time between various responsibilities. Pretesting of the survey requested has been recently completed by this author. The survey vehicle was designed by the author and CDR Martin Newman USN. The final vehicle, or parent vehicle, is presently being administered by Dr. Robert Morrison, together with CDR Newman, of the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California. The pretest vehicle was administered randomly to five hundred (500) Air Warfare Officers. The objective of the pretest survey as well as the parent vehicle is to achieve insight into factors which Naval Officers in operational billets perceive as enhancing or constraining their opportunity to learn and practice tactical employment of their weapons and combat systems.

The pretest survey vehicle consisted of 202 close-ended questions and was self administered to Naval Aviators assigned to ships, submarines, aircraft squadrons, and afloat staffs. The parent vehicle consists of 172 questions, is self-administerable, and has been distributed to 4000 Naval Officers of various designators, all assigned to operational billets. Survey design, methodology, computer programs written for analyses, feedback comments received on attached comment sheets, and preliminary results have been published in a recent Technical Report titled Tactical Competency Survey, PRETEST Data Base [Drogowski, 1983].

In order to enhance the tactical knowledge of Naval Officers, it will be necessary for the Department of the Navy not only to clearly define its goals and objectives in this area but also to specify the

level of tactical competence required in the planned tactics exam. The opportunity to become and remain tactically competent to the level prescribed will require the Navy to provide Naval Officers direction, guidance, time, and training. Training in the form of formal education, Fleet, Battle Group, Squadron, and Unit-level exercises, as well as individual self-study, are only a few ways for individuals to further their present level of tactical competency.

The Navy will need to determine its goals and objectives in this area before it can train and evaluate individuals in Tactical Competency. It will be necessary to instill in both the individuals and their respective commands a sense of priority for the tasks and functions involved. Unless special care is exercised, delegation of responsibilities for these tasks and functions may lead to problems of Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict.

B. OBJECTIVE

The objective of this study is to conduct empirical research on role conflict and role ambiguity in a military organizational environment. Analysis will be performed on a segment of data obtained from the previously discussed pretest survey titled Tactical Competency Survey. Presently the terms Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict tend to be used interchangeably in everyday conversation, and this use tends also to occur in published articles. It is therefore essential for the purpose of this study to distinguish between the two terms. The following definitions, provided by Katz and Kahn [1978], will apply throughout this study.

> We define ROLE CONFLICT as the simultaneous occurrence of two or more role expectations such that compliance with one would make the other more difficult or impossible. [Katz and Kahn, 1978: p. 204]

> In the prototypical form, ROLE AMBIGUITY simply means uncertainty about what the occupant of a particular office is supposed to do. But there may be uncertainty as well about many other aspects of a role, including the membership of the role-set, the ends to be served, the role enactment, and evaluation of present role behavior. [Katz and Kahn, 1978: p. 206]

The analyses completed in this study will be discussed in depth in Chapter V. A review of the literature on Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict precedes this discussion.

II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. [Matthew 6:24]

A. ROLES

1. Multiple Roles

The concept of multiple roles is a phenomenon in which an individual is normally in only one active role at a particular time, while other roles are in a relative degree of latency. Multiple roles relate to multiple positions which the individual may hold in various organizations. Quite often the individual holds these positions, perhaps of authority, in various organizational and institutional settings concurrently. Within each of these organizations, the individual occupies a particular position and thereby performs certain defined role activities associated with that position. The individual's role existence varies in complexity in accordance with the number of roles he plays in the different organizations, as well as with the amount of authority and power associated with each position he holds.

2. Role Sets

It is important to have a clear understanding of the difference between the concept of multiple roles and that of role sets. The former, multiple roles, refers to the different roles in different organizational settings. Role Set, on the other hand, relates to any of various orientations that a specific position in a particular organization may require. The position held by a Commanding Officer of a Naval Command offers an excellent example of role set. He is an

individual within a single command who is administrator, comptroller, legislator, and authoritarian. Multiple roles can be illustrated by looking at the same individual, but from the perspective of his involvement external to his immediate command--for instance, the positions held by the individual in church and civic organizations.

3. Role Perception

The accuracy of Role Perception regarding a task to be performed could have a definite impact on organizational effectiveness and efficiency. In their book, Organization and Management, Kast And Rosenzweig [1970] discuss role perception in detail. They provide the following insight into the area.

> Individuals have certain abilities and are motivated in varying degrees to perform various tasks. However, if a task is incorrectly perceived, the results may be quite ineffective from the organizational point of view. On the other hand, an activity or role associated with a particular position could be perceived quite accurately and yet inefficient performance could result because of deficiencies in ability and/or motivation. [Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970: p. 262]

B. CONFLICT

The term role refers to the behavior associated with a particular position. The expectation of behavior can be written or unwritten within an organization. A favorable working environment yielding favorable results, harmony, and a reduction in conflict is possible if all individuals within an organization understand, or are made aware of, their "legitimate" accepted behavior. When role demands in the form of behavior, task-completion priority, and task understanding is left to doubt, conflict will arise. Conflict in this sense does not mean overt antagonism or violence. It involves the possible simultaneous and not necessarily continuous occurrence of two or more

role-sendings such that the compliance with one precludes compliance with the others. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn suggest throughout their works that an individual will experience role conflict when he or she is confronted with two or more incompatible demands.

1. Types of Role Conflict

Referring to detailed studies Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, and Rosenthal in their book, Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity, Kahn [1964], identify six types of Role Conflict: Intrasender conflict, Intersender conflict, Inter-role conflict, Person-role conflict, Role overload, and Role ambiguity. Stoner [1978] provides a clear description and example of the six types of role conflict identified by Kahn et al [1964].

> INTRASENDER CONFLICT occurs when a single supervisor presents a subordinate with an incompatible set of orders or expectations. For example, a division manager orders a purchasing agent to buy materials immediately at a price that requires prior home office authorization, and then warns the agent not to violate the rulebook regulations.
>
> INTERSENDER CONFLICT arises when orders or expectations of a person or group clash with expectations or orders from other persons or groups. This can occur, for example, when a supervisor orders a foreman to engage in tighter supervision, while the work crew makes clear that any attempt to comply with this order will lead to serious trouble in the ranks.
>
> INTER-ROLE CONFLICT occurs when the different roles played by the same person give rise to conflict demands. In his roles as husband and father, for example, a man may be pressed to be home with his family in the evening and on weekends. But in his role as a loyal worker, the same man may have to put in a considerable amount of overtime to get his work done. This particular example of inter-role conflict is extremely common and often creates great tension both on the job and at home.
>
> PERSON-ROLE CONFLICT occurs when on the job role requirements run counter to the individual's needs or values. An executive ordered to bribe a domestic or foreign official, for example, might find the assignment completely antithetical to his or her moral values. Yet his or her desire for career success might make refusal to carry out the order difficult.

In ROLE-OVERLOAD CONFLICT, the individual is confronted with orders and expectations from a number of sources that cannot be completed within the given time and quality limits. Should quality be sacrificed in the interest of time? Should some tasks be carried out and others ignored? If so, which tasks should get priority? Dilemmas like these are a constant part of a manager's job.

ROLE AMBIGUITY occurs when an individual is provided insufficient or unclear information about his or her responsibilities. The individual is therefore uncertain about what he or she is "supposed" to do. Role ambiguity is often experienced by new managers who are given a set of duties and responsibilities without being told exactly how to carry them out. The stress experienced by an individual in such a situation can be considerable. [Stoner, 1978: pp. 536-538]

Kast and Rosenzweig [1970], in the book entitled Organization and Management, defined four (4) types of role conflict as Person-Role, Interrole, Intersender, and Intrasender. The following is provided to enhance the clarity of the concepts of role conflict and role ambiguity.

Four types of role conflict can be identified: (1) person-role, (2) interrole, (3) intersender, and (4) intrasender. As indicated previously, the concept of PERSON-ROLE CONFLICT is implied where personal attributes mediate between the sent role and that which is received by the focal person. Conflict occurs when the requirements of the role violate the needs, values, or capacities of the focal person.

INTERROLE CONFLICT relates to the phenomenon of multiple goals for individuals simultaneously acting in several or many organizations. A person may find hemself faced with sent expectations for a role in one organization which conflict with those for another role. [Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970: p. 266]

INTERSENDER CONFLICT results when various members of the role set have different expectations for a particular role person and hence transmit sendings which are conflicting. In this case, there are pressures on an individual from many directions as the various senders attempt to influence his behavior.

INTRASENDER CONFLICT develops when one sender transmits conflicting instructions or expects behavior which is impossible in the light of earlier directives. Intrasender conflict can occur with the transmission of messages which have conflicting parts. It is more common, however, for the conflict to arise from messages sent at different time periods. [Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970: p. 267]

One other type of role conflict should be mentioned--that of OVERLOAD. In many organizations, the expectations of various senders with regard to a particular position may not necessarily conflict.

> However, there may be so many of them that it is impossible for one individual to fulfill the requirements. In a sense, this creates a conflict between the expectations of the role and the individual's capacity to perform. Unless the focal person can establish a priority system or ignore some demands, he may "fall apart at the seams" or become ineffective in all his actions. Overload role conflict may be temporary if the various pressures are reduced over time. On the other hand, they may persist for an indefinite length of time and hence require more than ad hoc adjustments on the part of the focal person. [Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970: p. 268]

As noted by the researchers just quoted, role ambiguity is one form of role conflict. Normally researchers on this subject tend to consolidate the five types of role conflict into a single group and refer to it as "Role Conflict" and then to deal separately with "Role Ambiguity". Since the majority of the literature reviewed by the author of this Thesis discusses role conflict and role ambiguity as separate entities, the two terms, role conflict and role ambiguity, will be treated as if they are separate and distinguishable entities in this study.

2. Effects of Role Conflict and Role Ambiguity

A great many articles have been written recently on the effects of role conflict and role ambiguity on the organizations and individuals. The central theme throughout these articles is that the overall effects of role conflict and role ambiguity are adverse. The following quotations are typical of those found in the literature describing the effects of these two conditions on organizations and on individuals within organizations:

> Role conflict was negatively correlated with job satisfaction and positively correlated with job threat and anxiety. [Tosi, 1971: p. 17]

> Moreover, role conflicts tend to reduce one's general satisfaction with the job and the conditions surrounding it, and to undermine one's confidence in his superiors and in the organization as a whole. [Kahn, et al., 1964: p. 64]

> The presence of conflicting and/or ambiguous pressures is considered to indicate a level of organizational stress. Both role conflicts and role ambiguity have been demonstrated to be related negatively to role behavior of the focal person. [Tosi, 1971: pp. 8-9]

> Cohen concluded that ambiguity of the situation and inconsistency of direction raised the anxiety of subordinates, caused a less favorable attitude towards supervision, and lowered productivity. [Tosi, 1971: p. 10]

The nagative effects of role conflict and ambiguity as noted by Tosi [1971], Kahn [1964], and others apply to the physical well-being of individuals as well as the organization. Tosi continues:

> Responses to role pressures may take the form of behavior, affective reactions, and/or physiological symptoms. The specific nature of the response is a function of the role pressure as affected by the inter-personal relations and the personal attributes of the focal person. When the sent role pressures are clearly understood and there are no inconsistencies with other role demands, there will be few problems. However, the existence of role conflict and role ambiguity could pose problems for the individual and the organizations. [Tosi, 1971: p. 9]

In 1957 an experimental study was completed by Smith in which he measured the effects of role ambiguity on the problem solving ability of one hundred and forty (140) college students. The results as reported by Rizzo, et al. [1970] were that:

> (1) when groups were asked to solve problems without clarification of the role each member was to perform their efficiency was significantly less than when the roles were made clear; (2) role ambiguity markedly reduced group satisfaction with the experience; and (3) the hostility level was significantly higher for groups under condition of role ambiguity as compared to control groups. [Rizzo, et al., 1970: p. 154]

Scott, Mitchell and Birnbaum [1981] recently stated in a discussion of role ambiguity:

> The overall picture is that ambiguity makes it harder for us to do our jobs. We prefer certainty, ... it should be obvious that what-leads-to-what are unclear. This is a very unpleasant situation for most employees. [Scott, et al., 1981: p. 105]

Role ambiguity is often a problem for new managers who are assigned a set of duties but are not clearly told how to execute the duties Stoner [1978] notes. He adds that:

> The stress experienced by the individuals in such a situation can be considerable. [Stoner, 1978: p. 538]

Scott et al. [1981] in the following passage presents an even more ominous picture of the problem of role ambiguity:

> Research shows ambiguity leads to greater stress and tension and lower satisfaction and self-esteem. Some data from medical research shows that ambiguity may increase heart problems, and leads to anxiety and depression. Finally some studies with more "hard" data suggest that turnover is greater and productivity lower when role ambiguity exists. [Scott et al., 1981: p. 105]

Kahn et al. [1964] states

> In the extreme form, conflict and ambiguity pose for the individual an almost insurmountable problem.....Conditions of conflict and ambiguity, therefore, are not merely irritating; in persistent and extreme forms they are identity destroying. [Kahn, et al., 1964: p. 61]

> Some people experience a rather marked sense of futility when confronted with conflicts. A loss of self-esteem is often apparent. Others show symptoms of acute anxiety, and of confusion and indecision, which may leave them immobilized for a time. And for a few, symptoms of hysteria and psychosomatic disorders seem to be connected to tensions engendered by conflicts. [Kahn et al., 1964: p. 67]

3. Effects of Conflict and Ambiguity on Job Satisfaction

The majority of the literature reviewed so far demonstrates the adverse effects of role conflict and role ambiguity. One inconsistency was found, however; some research indicates that role conflict and role ambiguity are not always negatively related to job satisfaction. The following statement by Schuler [1975] provides a summary of these findings:

> Tosi and Tosi [1970] and Tosi [1971] found that role conflict and job satisfaction were negatively related, but they found no relationship between role ambiguity and job satisfaction. Rizzo et al. [1970], House and Rizzo [1972], and Hammer and Tosi [1974] found

significant negative relationships between job satisfaction and role ambiguity but no relationship between job satisfaction and role conflict. [Schuler, 1975: p. 683]

4. Ways of Minimizing Role Conflict

In reducing conflict to an acceptable level, conflicting demands must be somehow eliminated. Tosi and Carroll [1976] offer the following three arguments for the reduction of role conflict.

ELIMINATE AUTHORITY OVERLAPS. An authority overlap occurs when two superiors have the formally designated right to dictate subordinate actions in the same area. [Tosi and Carroll, 1976: p. 372]

CLARIFY AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS. Often a person experiences role conflict because he is not sure who has authority, and he responds to another who is in higher position but outside his chain of command simply because of the other's status. By increasing the person's awareness of those to whom he should, or must, respond, some conflict might be reduced. [Tosi and Carroll, 1976: p. 372]

INSURE THAT SUPERVISORS MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE HIERARCHY. This solution of course is related to clarifying authority relationships. The "territorial" imperative here for a manager should be not to allow intrusion by other managers outside the chain of command, unless appropriate. Whether or not an intrusion is appropriate is organizationally defined. [Tosi and Carroll, 1976: p. 372]

5. Ways to Reduce Role Ambiguity

In order to reduce role ambiguity, it is necessary to take two related steps according to Tosi and Carroll [1976].

DEFINE BEHAVIORAL AND OUTPUT REQUIREMENTS. Installing a management by objectives program is one approach for clarifying performance expectations, because the superior and the subordinate together determine the means of accomplishing the desired end results.

REWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT. When the individual has been successful, the organizational reward system must be used to recognize it. Managers will thus communicate to subordinates what to do and what is important not only with words, but also through action. This will keep the level of role ambiguity low. [Tosi and Carroll, 1976: p. 373]

This study will seek to determine if role conflict and role ambiguity presently exist within the confines of normal task completion by Naval Aviators, that is, within an environment of peace-time, where emphasis

shifts from fighting ability to administrative peace-time activities. If the Navy, defined here to be higher authority, sees peace time activities, such as administrative tasks, as being of a greater priority than war fighting tasks, such as tactical development, and the individual or command does not agree with the ranking of those tasks, role conflict exists as defined by the literature reviewed. Role ambiguity, on the other hand, will exist if the priorities are found to be unclear and/or do not lend themselves to differentiation. Chapter III, which follows, very briefly summarizes the survey vehicle used during the pretest phase as discussed in the Introduction. A brief review of the section used for analyses in this study is also included. In-depth review of the entire survey is possibly by referring to a published Technical Report, [Drogowski, 1983, Appendix C].

III. PREVIOUS METHODOLOGY USED

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a brief background of the survey vehicle used for gathering the data used in this study.

B. THE INSTRUMENT

Designed in late December 1982 and early January 1983 and titled "Tactical Competency Survey", the vehicle consisted of a two-page cover letter, two pages of instructions, a booklet of 202 questions, and a comment sheet to provide open-ended feedback. Although the questionnaire was developed to measure perceptions of Naval Officers in operational billets in the areas of Workload, Feedback Process, Communications, Time Distribution, Peer and Self Evaluation, Stress, and Resource Availability, it lends itself also to other areas of research. Span of Control, Organizational Behavior, Motivation, and Differentiation of Roles are only a few areas of possible additional research. By design, the questionnaire was broken down into six divisions: Background, Training, Workload, Organization, Resources, and Comments. It is within the second part, Training, that it is possible to extract questions pertaining to task comparison as analyzed in the current study. According to the Technical Report describing the survey instrument, five task areas are compared by the respondent.

> Scale ordering in the form of task comparisons of five specific tasks is completed by the individual. The task areas--Tactics, General Administration, Personnel and Navy Programs, Systems Technical Knowledge, and Officer Professional Qualification--are compared by the

> respondent. The respondent's perception as to the priority placed on a particular task when compared to another task is solicited. From this scaling, perceptions of Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict are obtainable through analysis. [Drogowski, 1983: p. 17]

The Technical Report continues by offering an explanation of how the task comparison is to be completed by the respondent.

> The individual is asked to scale order each of the tasks against another a total of three cyclic times. The first cycle gathers respondent perceptions in regards to how the command he is presently assigned to places priority on the completion of the two compared tasks. Cycles two and three gather the respondent perceptions once again but as to how the respondent perceives the United States Navy places priority on the task completion and how he as a Naval Officer perceives what the task priority should be. [Drogowski, 1983: p. 18]

It is the forementioned 30 questions (numbered 65 through 94) that are specifically analyzed within this study [Drogowski, 1983: pp. 56-61]. It is possible to extract questions other than these for analyses in the area of role conflict and role ambiguity, but no others were extracted for this purpose at this time. In order to complete analysis on the selected questions, it was found to be time saving to extract the entire Data Bank, together with the program written for analysis, as described in the Technical Report. The data remained unchanged in form and content during the analysis process within this study. The computer program was modified to analyze only the responses to the 30 particular questions, plus questions 1 through 11 which deal in the area of demographics. Chapter IV which follows, describes the modification of the program for the current analysis.

IV. PROGRAM FOR ANALYSIS

This chapter describes the program used to analyze only those responses to questions 1 to 11 and 65 to 94 of the data generated from the pretest of the survey completed by Drogowski [1983] in the area of Individual Tactical Development. The program was written to interface with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

A. PURPOSE OF THE PROGRAM

The computer program in Appendix "A" was written with the intent of analyzing only responses to questions 1 to 11, dealing with demographics, as well as 65 to 94, which deal with the comparison of the five tasks described earlier. A brief overview of these five tasks, as well as a review of instructions presented to the individual completing the survey (including definitions offered for clarity and common understanding), have been extracted from the Technical Report, Appendix "C", and appear here in Tables I and II.

B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The program (Appendix "A"), was created by modifying the orginal program, described in the Technical Report, as Appendix "D". This program consists of four functional parts, which are executed in the following sequence:

1. Data Definition Cards
    a) Data List
    b) Input Medium
    c) Recode
    d) Compute

e) Variable Labels (VAR LABELS)

f) Value Labels

g) Missing Values

h) Recode

i) Assign Missing Values

j) Print Formats

2. Task-Definition Cards

a) Frequency

3. Data Record

a) Read Input Data

4. Task-Definition Cards

a) Condescriptive

The program begins with the DATA LIST and INPUT MEDIUM cards. The functions of these cards remain unchanged from the original program. Recode instructions are used to convert the alphanumeric value labels ('A' to 'E') of CPCTGA (Command Perception, Comparison Tactics versus General Admin) to IPCSTKOP (Individual Perception, Comparison System Technical Knowledge versus Officer Professional Qualifications) into positive or negative single-digit integers. Additional Recode instructions are given by the use of a second RECODE card. This card recodes the assigned missing value label previously in alphanumeric form to a numeric value. Later in the program, the newly assigned missing values are deleted from the computations. The end result consists of the means and variances of variables used to describe the individual's perception of Command, Navy, and Individual task priority.

COMMENT cards are provided with each COMPUTE card to fulfill two purposes. The first is to enhance the readability of the program for

the user, and the second is to document the variable being generated as a result of the mathematical computation which follows in the related COMPUTE card. By first setting each task value equal to zero and then by completing, simple mathematical computations, the task-value mean, variance, range, sum, standard deviation, standard error, kurtosis, minimum value, maximum value, and skewness are derivable from the task-comparison data.

Variable Labels (VAR LABELS) and Value Labels are incorporated in the program to enhance clarity and understanding of the printed output. Missing values in the form of alphanumeric characters are assigned to demographic responses that have not been provided by individuals. The use of the final RECODE card and ASSIGN MISSING card prevents the processing of cases which do not contain a response to a task-comparison question (Question 65-94). It should be noted that a Frequency Distribution and Histogram Plot were obtained prior to any recoding of variables. Data is stored externally to the program, which accesses it from its external storage location.

After the program was found to be error free, analyses to determine the existence of role conflict and role ambiguity were performed. Results and methodology of the analyses are discussed in the following chapter.

TABLE I

TASKS AND DEFINITIONS

Tactics

Developing judgmental skills in effective employment of Command Weapons/Combat Systems.

General Administration

Includes, but is not limited to, Recurring Reports, Correspondence, Instructions, Messages.

Personnel and Navy Program Management

Includes, but is not limited to, all personnel-related Leadership, Morale, EEO.
requirements and all programs, e.g., Drug, Alcohol.

System Technical Knowledge

Includes, but is not limited to, requirements to be proficient regarding technical-systems understanding and all maintenance-systems-related work.

Officer Professional Qualifications

Includes, but is not limited to, Warfare Qualifications, Aircraft Commander, Engineer, Officer of Watch, Command Qualifications.

TABLE II

TASK COMPARISON INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions

IF YOU PERCEIVE that the task on THE LEFT HAS GREATER NAVY PRIORITY THAN the task on THE RIGHT, CIRCLE 'A' or 'B'. IF YOU PERCEIVE that the task on THE RIGHT HAS GREATER NAVY PRIORITY THAN the task on THE LEFT, CIRCLE 'D' or 'E'. Note that BY CIRCLING 'C' YOUR PERCEPTION IS of EQUAL PRIORITY.

Note that the following scale will be used for the next thirty questions only.

EXAMPLE

(LEFT TASK) VERSUS (RIGHT TASK)

A ------- B ------- C ------- D ------- E

SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER	HIGHER	EQUAL	HIGHER	SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER

V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter describes the results of the statistical analyses performed. The analyses presented in this chapter specifically deal only with questions 65 through 94 in the survey questionnaire. The intent of the analyses was to investigate the existence of possible role conflict or role ambiguity in the area of individual tactical development. The intention in this chapter is to focus primarily on the implications of the responses to these questions.

A. BASIC ANALYSIS

The selected questions were first analyzed by the use of the original program contained in the Technical Report [Drogowski, 1983] to determine if inappropriate variables existed within the data set. None were found. The next attempt at analysis used the program discussed in Chapter Four and presented in Appendix "A" to determine the frequency distribution of the responses to each question. Examination of the frequency distributions indicates that each question analyzed was answered by nearly all of the 286 individuals. These individuals had met the acceptance criteria for inclusion into the data set as discussed in the Technical Report. The least favorable questions of the 30 selected for analyses in the area of role conflict and role ambiguity were questions numbered 87 through 89. These three questions contained three missing cases each and 283 valid cases. Since the ratio of missing cases to valid cases is extremely small, the decision was made to include the three questions and to continue to analyze the 30 questions rather than just 27. The frequency distributions tend to

show a fairly uneven distribution of responses towards one task or another. This uneven distribution was considered to be favorable towards further analysis.

Results of the frequency-distribution analysis included Absolute Frequency Count, Relative Frequency Percent, Adjusted Frequency Percent, and Cumulative Frequency Percent separately for perceived Self, Command, and Navy evaluations. Observation of the frequency distributions obtained are included in Appendix "B".

Following the basic frequency-distribution analyses, histograms of the 30 questions were generated. The histograms make clear that the different tasks vary in perceived priority. Descriptive statistics were computed and are included with each histogram in Appendix "B".

As previously discussed in Chapter IV, the use of a "Recode" card in the program used for specific role conflict and role ambiguity analyses (Appendix A) recodes the five response values of "A" to "E" from alphanumeric to numeric values. In this recoding, it is obvious that the response variable "C", which equates to a value of "Equal", was to be assigned the value of zero (0). It is necessary to determine the sign of the remaining Likert scale values. Since "A" and "E" were to indicate "HIGHER" and "D" and "E" indicate "LOWER" for the focal task, "A" and "B" were assigned positive values, "D" and "E" negative. The value of the response "A" was thus set at (+2), "B" (+1), "D" (-1), "E" (-2).

B. DETERMINATION OF MEAN VALUES FOR EACH FOCAL TASK

Means of task differences created by individual perceptions of Navy, Individual (Self), and Command priorities were computed by use

of the program in (Appendix A). The actual computations are based on the following equations, in which b_i and b_j are scale values for tasks i and j and b_j* is the scale value for task j on a scale that has a mean of zero for all five tasks:

$$b_j^* = \frac{1}{5} \sum_{i}^{5} (b_j - b_i)$$

where j indicates the focal task and i indicates the focal task or any other task.

In this equation, $(b_j - b_i)$ is the difference perceived by an individual for tasks i and j, e.g., $(b_j - b_i)$ is equal to +2, +1, 0, -1, or -2 depending on the individual's response to the item comparing the two tasks. Table III shows the results from use of this formula.

C. ANALYSES OF COMPUTED MEANS

1. Role Conflict

The scale values computed by the preceding formula and shown as means in Table III are obviously unequal. Plotting horizontally the tasks being compared and vertically the value of the three means for each task clearly illustrates the existence of role conflict in Individual Tactical Development. Table IV, PLOTTED MEANS, illustrates that the individuals surveyed perceived three distinct priorities for any one focal task.

Had the computed mean values been equal to each other, then it could have been said that role conflict does not exist however this is not the case. Another view can be taken for the determination of the existence of role conflict. Additional analysis of the generated mean

TABLE III

PRIORITY PERCEPTION OF TASK DIFFERENCES CREATED BY INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTIONS OF NAVY, INDIVIDUAL (SELF), AND COMMAND PRIORITY, WITH ASSOCIATED MEAN VALUES.

Navy Priority (Perception)		
1	Personnel and Navy Program Management	(+0.197)
2	General Admin	(+0.015)
3	Officer Professional Qualifications	(0.000)
4	System Technical Knowledge	(-0.047)
5	Tactics	(-0.165)
Command Priority (Perception)		
1	Tactics	(+0.119)
2	System Technical Knowledge	(+0.062)
3	Officer Professional Qualifications	(+0.053)
4	Personnel and Navy Program Management	(-0.091)
5	General Admin	(-0.139)
Individual (Self) Priority (Perception)		
1	Tactics	(+0.528)
2	System Technical Knowledge	(+0.240)
3	Officer Professional Qualifications	(+0.234)
4	Personnel and Navy Program Management	(-0.348)
5	General Admin	(-0.650)

TABLE IV

PLOTTED MEAN VALUES



TABLE IV CONTINUED

PLOTTED MEAN VALUES



values was completed. By placing the tasks in a list according to increasing or decreasing mean values for each of the three different view points (Self, Command, Navy), the existence of role conflict can be determined.

Table V illustrates that the rank order of Task Means are different for Navy compared with Command, and for Navy compared with Individual (Self), but are the same for Command and Individual. Herein lie the seeds of role conflict.

The data for the sample of 286 Naval Aviators clearly supports the existence of role conflict between the Navy and its Commands and their personnel in the area of Individual Tactical Development.

By use of the derived rank-order comparisons listed in Table V, Kendall's Tau was computed. Results, illustrated in Table VI, are the Tau coefficients of rank-order correlation. Notice that the coefficient for Command and Individual (Self) is equal to 1.00. This means that no role conflict between the two exists for the officers surveyed. However, when comparing the coefficients of rank correlation of Navy with Command, and Navy with Individual (Self), we observe that they are both equal to -.80. This result indicates that role conflict does exist between Navy and Command and between Navy and Individual within the Air Warfare Communities.

It must be stated that this data set does not allow for the conclusion to be drawn that role conflict exists throughout the entire Navy. This is because the survey has been used as a pretest vehicle and does not solicit responses from individuals outside of the Aviation Community. It must also be stated that this study makes two very important assumptions as far as interpretation of the results is concerned. First,

TABLE V

RANK ORDERING OF PRIORITY PERCEPTIONS

Navy Priority (Perception)

1	Personnel and Navy Program Management	(+0.197)
2	General Admin	(+0.015)
3	Officer Professional Qualifications	(0.000)
4	System Technical Knowledge	(-0.047)
5	Tactics	(-0.165)

Command Priority (Perception)

1	Tactics	(+0.119)
2	System Technical Knowledge	(+0.062)
3	Officer Professional Qualifications	(+0.053)
4	Personnel and Navy Program Management	(-0.091)
5	General Admin	(-0.139)

Individual (Self) Priority (Perception)

1	Tactics	(+0.528)
2	System Technical Knowledge	(+0.240)
3	Officer Professional Qualifications	(+0.234)
4	Personnal and Navy Program Management	(-0.348)
5	General Admin	(-0.650)

TABLE VI

Kendall's Tau

Navy to Command	-0.80	$p < 0.05$
Navy to Individual	-0.80	$p < 0.05$
Command to Individual	+1.00	$p < 0.05$

it is assumed that all individuals with the designators 1310, 1315, 1320, and 1325 perceive task priority the same. Previous research has shown this not to be the case at all times [Morrison, 1983]. The second assumption is that all the various aviation communities perceive the defined tasks the same. Data from all these communities were combined in this study as were the data from all designator groups. Had questions 65 through 94 been analyzed of separately for the different groups according to the demographic information obtained, the overall samples would have been unsatisfactorily small.

A summary statement of the results within the area of role conflict is that the individuals comprising the sample clearly indicated that ROLE CONFLICT DOES NOT ARISE from differences BETWEEN COMMANDS AND INDIVIDUAL (SELF) but DOES ARISE from differences BETWEEN NAVY AND INDIVIDUAL (Self) AND BETWEEN NAVY AND COMMAND. SAMPLED INDIVIDUALS PERCEIVE THAT THE NAVY PLACES GREATEST PRIORITY ON PERSONNEL AND NAVY-RELATED PROGRAMS MANAGEMENT (grand mean of +0.197) and LEAST PRIORITY ON TACTICS (-0.165). INDIVIDUAL COMMAND AND THE INDIVIDUAL (SELF) PERCEIVE TACTICS AS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TASK (+0.119, +0.528) and GENERAL ADMIN AS THE LEAST IMPORTANT (-0.139, -0.650) during the present peace-time environment.

Navy priorities appear to be polar opposites of the Individual (Self) and Command priorities. It is interesting to note that the distance between the plotted means of Command and Individual (Self) are on the order of four to six times the magnitude of the distances between the plotted means of Command and Navy. This phenomenon may be explained in the following way. The individual has greater daily contact with his individual command than he does with the Navy (Higher

authority). The author believes that daily contact, close communications, and loyalty to unit or command influences this identity of priorities. THE STRONGEST SOURCES OF ROLE CONFLICT APPEAR TO EXIST IN THE AREA OF TACTICS AND THE LEAST IN OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS. Additional analyses should be completed to determine the extent of role conflict within each specific rank. Role conflict leads to stress and frustration. It would appear that the Navy (in general) has some very frustrated air warfare officers in operational billets.

The following are quotes taken from specific comments received from individuals surveyed and have been extracted from the companion Technical Report [Drogowski, 1983].

> Naval officers would have more time to develop their primary warfare skills if the Navy would reduce the massive paperwork/inspection/etc. requirements that consume an inordinate amount of our time. We should be more concerend about developing our operational readiness posture for conducting war and maintaining the peace. At times we lose sight of our priorities and instead bury and burden ourselves with paperwork. (O-4, Ship, ASW Module Watch Officer.) [Drogowski, 1983: Appendix "I"]

> The tactical competency of the average Naval Officer is appaling. Due to the extreme administrative workload, officers are not allowed time to seek tactical knowledge, nor are they encouraged to pursue an active tactical training program. Until the Navy reduces the administrative burden, and stresses tactical expertise vice managerial skills as the primary driving force for promotion and preferential orders, the Navy will continue to lag behind our allies in tactical competence. We may have the best equipment, technical knowledge, and weaponry, but we have the worst tactical minds. (O-4, Ship, ASST Air OPS/Training Officer.) [Drogowski, 1983: Appendix "I"]

> I would like to see more time spent on tactics and training. I.E. more flight/simulator time. Less time spend on administrative B.S. (O-4, Air Squadron, Division Officer.) [Drogowski, 1983: Appendix "I"]

> In a single seat A/C squadron; so much time is required in administrative routine, discipline and various programs management that it precludes time for even the most routine professional reading. (O-5, Air Squadron, XO.) [Drogowski, 1983: Appendix "I"]

The biggest problem with tactical study is the time required to accomplish our 'desk' jobs. The paperwork level required by the Navy is overwhelming. (O-3, Air Squadron, Pilot/Personnel Officer.) [Drogowski, 1983: Appendix "I"]

My particular command places importance on tactics development and employment. (O-4, Air Squadron, Safety Officer.) [Drogowski, 1983: Appendix "I"]

D. THE QUESTION OF ROLE AMBIGUITY

A level of role ambiguity, illustrated in Table VII, was computed by determining the mean of the three variances for each focal task. The following equation was used for this purpose:

$$RAL = \frac{1}{3} \sum_{j}^{3} V_j$$

where V_j is the variance associated with Task j and RAL is the level of role ambiguity.

The mean variances of individual perceptions of Navy, Individual (Self), and Command priorities illustrated in Table VII indicate the existence of varying amounts of role ambiguity for the five different tasks examined in this study. As shown in Table VII, Tactics was the area of greatest role ambiguity, while Officer Professional Qualifications was the least role-ambiguous task area.

Role ambiguity may lead to difficulty in performing well on the related tasks involved. It appears that Air Warfare Officers perceive their task to achieve Officer Professional Qualifications more clearly than task achievement in the performance and development of tactics. Tactics as a task is ambiguously defined, and this ambiguity restricts an Air Warfare Officer's ability to perform as effectively as possible.

TABLE VII

LEVELS OF ROLE AMBIGUITY.

Role ambiguity level for:
Tactics.....(+0.437)

Role ambiguity level for:
General Admin.....(+0.342)

Role ambiguity level for:
Personnel and Navy Related Programs.....(+0.283)

Role ambiguity level for:
System Technical Knowledge.....(+0.212)

Role ambiguity level for:
Officer Professional Qualifications.....(+0.200)

APPENDIX A

```
DATA LIST       FIXED(7)/1 GRADE 6 (A) DESIG 8 (A) COAST 10 (A)
                COMM 12 (A) JOB 14 (A) TJOB 16 (A) INVOL 18 (A)
                ACSER 20 (A) CURRM 22 (A) PERSADU 24 (A) GPROF 26 (A)
                /2 CPCTGA 66 (A)
                CPCTPNPM 68 (A) CPCTSTK 70 (A) CPCTOPQ 72 (A)
                /3 CPCGAPNP 6 (A) CPCGASTK 8 (A) CPCGAOPQ 10 (A)
                CPCPNPST 12 (A) CPCPNPOP 14 (A) CPCSTKOP 16 (A)
                NPCTGA 18 (A) NPCTPNPM 20 (A) NPCTSTK 22 (A) NPCTOPQ 24
                (A) NPCGAPNP 26 (A) NPCGASTK 28 (A) NPCGAOPQ 30 (A)
                NPCPNPST 32 (A) NPCPNPOP 34 (A) NPCSTKOP 36 (A)
                IPCTGA 38 (A) IPCTPNPM 40 (A) IPCTSTK 42 (A) IPCTOPQ 44
                (A) IPCGAPNP 46 (A) IPCGASTK 48 (A) IPCGAOPQ 50 (A)
                IPCPNPST 52 (A) IPCPNPOP 54 (A) IPCSTKOP 56 (A)

INPUT MEDIUM    DISK

RECODE          CPCTGA TO IPCSTKOP ('A'=2) ('B'=1) ('C'=0) ('D'=-1) ('E'=-2)
RECODE          CPCTGA TO IPCSTKOP ('&'=-99999)

COMMENT         TC = TACTICS TASK 'COMMAND' MEAN
COMPUTE         TC = (CPCTGA + CPCTPNPM + CPCTSTK + CPCTOPQ ) / 5

COMMENT         GAC = GENERAL ADMIN 'COMMAND' MEAN
COMPUTE         GAC = (CPCGAPNP + CPCGASTK + CPCGAOPQ - CPCTGA ) / 5

COMMENT         PNPC = PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 'COMMAND'
COMMENT              MEAN
COMPUTE         PNPC = (CPCPNPST + CPCPNPOP - CPCTPNPM - CPCGAPNP ) / 5

COMMENT         STKC = SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 'COMMAND' MEAN
COMPUTE         STKC = (CPCSTKOP - CPCTSTK - CPCGASTK - CPCPNPST ) / 5

COMMENT         OPQC = OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 'COMMAND'
COMMENT              MEAN
COMPUTE         OPQC = (-CPCTOPQ - CPCGAOPQ - CPCPNPOP - CPCSTKOP ) / 5


COMMENT         TN = TACTICS TASK 'NAVY' MEAN
COMPUTE         TN = (NPCTGA + NPCTPNPM + NPCTSTK + NPCTOPQ ) / 5

COMMENT         GAN = GENERAL ADMIN 'NAVY' MEAN
COMPUTE         GAN = (NPCGAPNP + NPCGASTK + NPCGAOPQ - NPCTGA ) / 5

COMMENT         PNPN = PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 'NAVY' MEAN
COMPUTE         PNPN = (NPCPNPST + NPCPNPOP - NPCTPNPM - NPCGAPNP ) / 5

COMMENT         STKN = SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 'NAVY' MEAN
COMPUTE         STKN = (NPCSTKOP - NPCTSTK - NPCGASTK - NPCPNPST ) / 5

COMMENT         OPQN = OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 'NAVY' MEAN
COMPUTE         OPQN = (-NPCTOPQ - NPCGAOPQ - NPCPNPOP - NPCSTKOP ) / 5


COMMENT         TI = TACTICS TASK 'INDIVIDUAL' MEAN
COMPUTE         TI = (IPCTGA + IPCTPNPM + IPCTSTK + IPCTOPQ ) / 5

COMMENT         GAI = GENERAL ADMIN 'INDIVIDUAL' MEAN
COMPUTE         GAI = (IPCGAPNP + IPCGASTK + IPCGAOPQ - IPCTGA ) / 5

COMMENT         PNPI = PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 'INDIVIDUAL'
COMMENT              MEAN
COMPUTE         PNPI = (IPCPNPST + IPCPNPOP - IPCTPNPM - IPCGAPNP ) / 5

COMMENT         STKI = SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 'INDIVIDUAL' MEAN
COMPUTE         STKI = (IPCSTKOP - IPCTSTK - IPCGASTK - IPCPNPST ) / 5

COMMENT         OPQI = OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 'INDIVIDUAL'
COMMENT              MEAN
COMPUTE         OPQI = (-IPCTOPQ - IPCGAOPQ - IPCPNPOP - IPCSTKOP ) / 5
```

```
COMMENT         THE FOLLOWING SECTION OF THIS PROGRAM  DEFINES THE
COMMENT         VARIABLES USED IN QUESTIONS ONE (1) TO TWELVE (12)

COMMENT         SECTION I   (BACKGROUND DATA)
COMMENT         QUESTIONS THIS SECTION  1-17
COMMENT         QUESTION 1-17

VAR LABELS
                GRADE, INDIVIDUALS' MOST SENIOR GRADE SELECTED/
                DESIG, DESIGNATOR/
                COAST, ASSIGNED COAST/
                COMM,  PRESENT COMMAND/
                JOB,   PRESENT JOB OR BILLET ASSIGNED/
                TJOB,  TIME IN PRESENT JOB OR BILLET/
                INVCI, COMMANDS MOST RECENT INVOLVEMENT/
                ACSER,    TIME IN ACTIVE SERVICE/
                CUREM,    COMMANDS CURRENT EMPLOYMENT/
                PERSEADU, PERCENT SEA DUTY/
                GPROF,    OVERALL MOST PROFICIENT WORK AREA/
```

```
COMMENT
COMMENT
COMMENTS        THE FOLLOWING SECTION OF THIS PROGRAM  DEFINES THE
                VARIABLES USED IN QUESTIONS SIXTY FIVE (65) TO
                SEVENTY-FOUR (74).

VAR LABELS      CPCTGA,     INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISON OF  TACTICS VERSUS GENERAL ADMIN/

                CPCTPNPM,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS PERSONNEL AND
                            NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/

                CPCTSTK,    INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS SYSTEM TECNICAL
                            KNOWLEDGE/

                CPCTCPQ,    INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS OFFICER PRO-
                            FESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/

                CPCGAPNP,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS PERSONNEL
                            AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/

                CPCGASTK,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS SYSTEM
                            TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/

                CPCGAOPQ,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS OFFICER
                            PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/

                CPCPNPST,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
                            MANAGEMENT VERSUS SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/

                CPCPNPOP,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
                            MANAGEMENT VERSUS OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
                            QUALIFICATIONS/

                CPCSTKOP,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE VERSUS
                            OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/
```

```
COMMENT         THE FOLLOWING SECTION OF THIS PROGRAM  DEFINES THE
COMMENT         VARIABLES USED IN QUESTIONS SEVENTY FIVE (75) TO
COMMENTS        EIGHTY-FOUR (84).

VAR LABELS      NPCTGA,    INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISON OF TACTICS VERSUS GENERAL ADMIN/

                NPCTPNPM,  INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS PERSONNEL AND
                           NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/

                NPCTSTK,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS SYSTEM TECNICAL
                           KNOWLEDGE/

                NPCTOPQ,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS OFFICER PRO-
                           FESSICNAL QUALIFICATIONS/

                NPCGAPNP,  INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS PERSONNEL
                           AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/

                NPCGASTK,  INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS SYSTEM
                           TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/

                NPCGAOPQ,  INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS OFFICER
                           PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/

                NPCPNPST,  INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
                           MANAGEMENT VERSUS SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/

                NPCPNPOP,  INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
                           MANAGEMENT VERSUS OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
                           QUALIFICATIONS/

                NPCSTKOP,  INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
                           COMPARISION OF SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE VERSUS
                           OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/
```

```
COMMENT         THE FOLLOWING SECTION OF THIS PROGRAM  DEFINES THE
COMMENT         VARIABLES USED IN QUESTIONS EIGHTY FIVE (85) TO
COMMENTS        NINETY-FOUR (94).

VAR LABELS      IPCTGA,     INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISON OF TACTICS VERSUS GENERAL ADMIN/

                IPCTPNPM,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS PERSONNEL AND
                            NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/

                IPCTSTK,    INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS SYSTEM TECNICAL
                            KNOWLEDGE/

                IPCTOPQ,    INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS OFFICER PRO-
                            FESSICNAL QUALIFICATIONS/

                IPCGAPNP,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS PERSONNEL
                            AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/

                IPCGASTK,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS SYSTEM
                            TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/

                IPCGAOPQ,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS OFFICER
                            PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/

                IPCPNPST,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
                            MANAGEMENT VERSUS SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/

                IPCPNPOP,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
                            MANAGEMENT VERSUS OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
                            QUALIFICATIONS/

                IPCSTKOP,   INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
                            COMPARISION OF SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE VERSUS
                            OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/
```

```
COMMENT         THE FOLLOWING AREA SETS THE ABOVE DEFINED VARIABLES EQUAL
COMMENT         TO THERE RESPECTIVE VALUES.

VALUE LABELS    GRADE
                     ('A') 0-7  ('B') 0-6  ('C') 0-5
                     ('D') 0-4  ('E') 0-3/
                DESIG
                     ('A') 1110  ('B') 1115  ('C') 1120
                     ('D') 1125  ('E') 1310  ('F') 1315
                     ('G') 1320  ('H') 1325  ('I') OTHER/
                COAST
                     ('A') ATLANTIC
                     ('B') PACIFIC/
                COMM
                     ('A') NUMBERED FLEET STAFF
                     ('B') CARRIER GROUP STAFF
                     ('C') CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP STAFF
                     ('D') AMPHIBIOUS GROUP STAFF
                     ('E') SUBMARINE GROUP STAFF
                     ('F') CARRIER AIR WING STAFF
                     ('G') DESTROYER SQUADRON STAFF
                     ('H') MINE WARFARE STAFF
                     ('I') AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON STAFF
                     ('J') SUBMARINE SQUADRON STAFF
                     ('K') FUNCTIONAL WING STAFF
                     ('L') OTHER STAFF
                     ('M') CV
                     ('N') LHA
                     ('O') CG DD DDG FFG FF
                     ('P') SUBMARINE
                     ('Q') MINE WARFARE TYPE SHIP
                     ('R') MISF TYPE SHIP
                     ('S') AMPHIBIOUS TYPE SHIP
                     ('T') OTHER TYPE SHIP
                     ('U') VA SQUADRON
                     ('V') VAQ SQUADRON
                     ('W') VAW SQUADRON
                     ('X') VF SQUADRON
                     ('Y') VP SQUADRON
                     ('Z') VQ SQUADRON
                     ('0') VS SQUADRON
                     ('1') HELO SQUADRON
                     ('2') OTHER/
```

```
JOB
      ('A') STAFF COMMAND
      ('B') CHIEF OF STAFF CHIEF STAFF OFFICER
      ('C') OPS,PLANS GROUP
      ('D') MAINT,ENGINEERING GROUP
      ('E') WEAPONS,COMBAT SYSTEMS
      ('F') COMMUNICATIONS GROUP
      ('G') READINESS,TRAINING
      ('H') TACTICS GROUP
      ('I') OTHER STAFF
      ('J') CC,XO
      ('K') OPS,AIR OPS,AIR DEPT HEAD
      ('L') OPS,AIR OPS,AIR NON-DEPT HEAD
      ('M') WEAPONS,COMBAT SYSTEMS DEPT HEAD
      ('N') WEAPONS,COMBAT SYSTEMS NONDEPT HEAD
      ('O') MAINT,ENGINEERING DEPT HEAD
      ('P') MAINT,ENGINEERING NON-DEPT HEAD
      ('Q') ADMIN GROUP
      ('R') SAFETY, NATOPS GROUP
      ('S') FIRST LT
      ('T') NAVIGATOR,ASSIST NAVIGATOR
      ('U') COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
      ('V') TRAINING DEPT HEAD
      ('W') TRAINING NON-DEPT HEAD
      ('X') OTHER/
TJOB
      ('A') LESS THAN 3 MONTHS
      ('B') > OR EQUAL TO 3 MONTHS < 6
      ('C') > OR EQUAL TO 6 MONTHS < 1 YEAR
      ('D') > OR EQUAL TO 1 YEAR < 2 YEARS
      ('E') > OR EQUAL TO 2 YEARS/
INVCL
      ('A') PREDEPLOY WRKUP NOT DEPLOY OR OVERHL
      ('B') PREDEPLOY WRKUP AND DEPLOY BUT NOT OVERHL
      ('C') PREDEPLOY WRKUP,DEPLOY AND OVERHL
      ('D') DEPLOY BUT NOT OVERHL AND PREDEPLOY WRKUP
      ('E') DEPLOY AND OVERHL BUT NOT PREDEPLOY WRKUP
      ('F') OVERHL BUT NOT PREDEPLOY WRKUP AND DEPLOY
      ('G') OVERHL AND PREDEPLOY WRKUP BUT NOT DEPLOY
      ('H') POSTDEPLOY TRAIN CYCLE
      ('I') OPS OTHER THAN LISTED ABOVE/
```

```
                ACSER
                      ('A') LESS THAN 5 YEARS
                      ('B') > OR EQUAL TO 5 YEARS < 10 YEARS
                      ('C') > OR EQUAL TO 10 YEARS < 15 YEARS
                      ('D') > OR EQUAL TO 15 YEARS < 20 YEARS
                      ('E') > OR EQUAL TO 20 YEARS < 25 YEARS
                      ('F') > OR EQUAL TO 25 YEARS/
                CUREM
                      ('A') DEPLOYED
                      ('B') PERMANENTLY DEPLOYED COMMAND
                      ('C') DEPLOY WORKUP < 3 MONTHS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT
                      ('D') DEPLOY WORKUP > 3 MONTHS < 1 YEAR
                      ('E') DEPLOYMENT WORKUP > 1 YEAR
                      ('F') SHIPYARD OVERHAUL
                      ('G') ASSIST OTHERS IN DEPLOYMENT WORKUP
                      ('H') POSTDEPLOYMENT TRAINING CYCLE
                      ('I') OTHER/
                PERSEADU
                      ('A') < 25%
                      ('B') > EQUAL TO 25% < 50%
                      ('C') > EQUAL TO 50% < 75%
                      ('D') > EQUAL TO 75% < 100%
                      ('E') = 100%/
                GPROF
                      ('A') OPS,PLANS,TRAINING
                      ('B') MAINTENANCE,ENGINEERING
                      ('C') COMBAT SYSTEMS,WEAPONS
                      ('D') ADMIN,LOGISTICS
                      ('E') COMBINATION OF A&B,B&C,A&C
                      ('F') COMBINATION OF "D" AND 1 OTHER
                      ('G') COMBINATION OF "D" AND 2 OTHERS
                      ('H') OTHER/
VALUE LABELS    CPCTGA TO IPCSTKOP
                      ('A') SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER
                      ('B') HIGHER
                      ('C') EQUAL
                      ('D') HIGHER
                      ('E') SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER/
MISSING VALUES  GRADE TO GPROF ('&')
RECODE          CPCTGA TO OPQI (LOW THRU -99 = -99)
RECODE          CPCTGA TO OPQI ( 99 THRU  HI = -99)
ASSIGN MISSING  CPCTGA TO OPQI (-99)
PRINT FORMATS   GRADE TO GPROF (A)
FREQUENCIES     GENERAL = GRADE TO GPROF CPCTGA TO IPCSTKOP
READ INPUT DATA
CONDESCRIPTIVE  CPCTGA TO OPQI
FINISH
```

APPENDIX B

QUESTION 1

GRADE Individuals Most Senior Grade Selected

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
O-6	B	4	1.4	1.4	1.4
O-5	C	59	20.6	20.7	22.1
O-4	D	137	47.9	48.1	70.2
O-3	E	85	29.7	29.8	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

NOTE

Although the rank of Captain (O-6) was suppressed from the sample selection, it is assumed that the four individuals returning the survey indicating their rank of Captain have been recently promoted.

QUESTION 2

DESIG Designator

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
1310	E	175	61.2	61.2	61.2
1315	F	18	6.3	6.3	67.5
1320	G	90	31.5	31.5	99.0
1325	H	3	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 286 Missing Cases 0

QUESTION 3

COAST Assigned Coast

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Atlantic	A	139	48.6	48.8	48.8
Pacific	B	146	51.0	51.2	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

COMM Present Command QUESTION 4

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Numbered Fleet Staff	A	5	1.7	1.9	1.9
Carrier Group Staff	B	6	2.1	2.2	4.1
Cruiser Destroyer Group Staff	C	2	0.7	0.7	4.9
Carrier Air Wing Staff	F	6	2.1	2.2	7.1
Functional Wing Staff	K	5	1.7	1.9	9.0
Other Staff	L	1	0.3	0.4	9.3
CV	M	94	32.9	35.1	44.4
LHA	N	5	1.7	1.9	46.3
Amphibious Type Ship	S	13	4.5	4.9	51.1
Other Type Ship	T	1	0.3	0.4	51.5
VA Squadron	U	36	12.6	13.4	64.9
VAQ Squadron	V	4	1.4	1.5	66.4
VAW Squadron	W	3	1.0	1.1	67.5
VF Squadron	X	17	5.9	6.3	73.9
VP Squadron	Y	32	11.2	11.9	85.8

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
VQ Squadron	Z	3	1.0	1.1	86.9
VS Squadron	0	6	2.1	2.2	89.2
Helo Squadron	1	25	8.7	9.3	98.5
Other	2	4	1.4	1.5	100.0
	&	18	6.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 268 Missing Cases 18

JOB Present Job or Billet Assigned QUESTION 5

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Chief of Staff/Chief Staff Officer	B	1	0.3	0.4	0.4
OPS/Plans Group	C	10	3.5	3.7	4.0
Weapons/Combat Systems Group	E	1	0.3	0.4	4.4
Communications Group	F	1	0.3	0.4	4.8
Readiness/Training Group	G	7	2.4	2.6	7.3
Other Staff	I	4	1.4	1.5	8.8
CO/XO	J	20	7.0	7.3	16.1
OPS/Air OPS/Air Dept. Head	K	43	15.0	15.8	31.9
OPS/Air OPS/Air Non-Dept. Head	L	62	21.7	22.7	54.6
Weapons/Combat Systems Dept. Head	M	5	1.7	1.8	56.4
Weapons/Combat Systems-Non Dept. Head	N	18	6.3	6.6	63.0
Maint./Engineering Dept. Head	O	8	2.8	2.9	65.9
Maint./Engineering Non-Dept. Head	P	20	7.0	7.3	73.3

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Admin. Group	Q	11	3.8	4.0	77.3
Safety/NATOPS Group	R	24	8.4	8.8	86.1
Navigator/Asst. Navigator	T	6	2.1	2.2	88.3
Communications Officer	U	4	1.4	1.5	89.7
Training Department Head	V	8	2.8	2.9	92.7
Training Non-Dept. Head	W	6	2.1	2.2	94.9
Other	X	14	4.9	5.1	100.0
	&	13	4.5	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 273 Missing Cases 13

TJOB Time in Present Job or Billet QUESTION 6

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Less than 3 months	A	44	15.4	15.4	15.4
Greater than or equal to 3 months, less than 6 months	B	55	19.2	19.3	34.7
Greater than or equal to 6 months, less than 1 year	C	84	29.4	29.5	64.2
Greater than or equal to 1 year, less than 2 years	D	89	31.1	31.2	95.4
Greater than or equal to 2 years	E	13	4.5	4.6	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

INVOL Commands Most Recent Involvement QUESTION 7

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Predeployment workup but not deployment or overhaul	A	36	12.6	12.8	12.8
Predeployment workup and deployment but not overhaul	B	84	29.4	29.9	42.7
Predeployment workup, deployment and overhaul	C	33	11.5	11.7	54.4
Deployment but not overhaul and predeployment workup	D	32	11.2	11.4	65.8
Deployment and overhaul but not predeployment workup	E	20	7.0	7.1	73.0
Overhaul but not predeployment workup and deployment	F	12	4.2	4.3	77.2
Overhaul and predeployment workup but not deployment	G	10	3.5	3.6	80.8
Postdeployment training cycle	H	25	8.7	8.9	89.7
Operations other than those listed above	I	29	10.1	10.3	100.0
	&	5	1.7	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 281 Missing Cases 5

ACSER Time in Active Service QUESTION 8

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Less than 5 years	A	27	9.4	9.5	9.5
Greater than or equal to 5 years, less than 10 years	B	84	29.4	29.5	38.9
Greater than or equal to 10 years, less than 15 years	C	107	37.4	37.5	76.5
Greater than or equal to 15 years, less than 20 years	D	57	19.9	20.0	96.5
Greater than or equal to 20 years, less than 25 years	E	10	3.5	3.5	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CUREM Commands Current Employment QUESTION 9

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Deployed (does not include permanently deployed commands)	A	101	35.3	35.8	35.8
Permanently deployed command having completed all workup	B	17	5.9	6.0	41.8
Deployment workup, 3 months or less before deployment	C	36	12.6	12.8	54.6
Deployment workup, more than 3 months but less than 1 year before deployment	D	46	16.1	16.3	70.9
Deployment workup greater than 1 year before deployment	E	4	1.4	1.4	72.3
Shipyard overhaul	F	28	9.8	9.9	82.3
Assisting other commands with deployment workup	G	8	2.8	2.8	85.1
Postdeployment training cycle	H	18	6.3	6.4	91.5
Other than employments listed above	I	24	8.4	8.5	100.0
	&	4	1.4	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 282 Missing Cases 4

PERSEADU Percent Sea Duty QUESTION 10

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Less than 25%	A	20	7.0	7.1	7.1
Greater than or equal to 25%, less than 50%	B	123	43.0	43.5	50.5
Greater than or equal to 50%, less than 75%	C	107	37.4	37.8	88.3
Greater than or equal to 75%, less than 100%	D	31	10.8	11.0	99.3
Equal to 100%	E	2	0.7	0.7	100.0
	&	3	1.0	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 283 Missing Cases 3

GPROF Overall Most Proficient Work Area QUESTION 11

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Operations (OPS/Plans/Training)	A	85	29.7	29.8	29.8
Maintenance/Engineering	B	17	5.9	6.0	35.8
Combat Systems/Weapons	C	19	6.6	6.7	42.5
Admin/Logistics	D	7	2.4	2.5	44.9
Combination of A&B, B&C or A&C	E	107	37.4	37.5	82.5
Combination of 'D' and one other	F	30	10.5	10.5	93.0
Combination of 'D' and two others	G	15	5.2	5.3	98.2
Other	H	5	1.7	1.8	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CPCTGA Individuals' Perception of Command Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus General Admin.

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	42	14.7	14.7	14.7
Higher	B	111	38.8	38.8	53.5
Equal	C	43	15.0	15.0	68.5
Higher	D	71	24.8	24.8	93.4
Significantly Higher	E	19	6.6	6.6	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 286 Missing Cases 0

Question #65

CPCTGA Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISON OF TACTICS versus GENERAL ADMIN.



Valid Cases 286 Missing Cases 0

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.301	Kurtosis	-1.009
Variance	1.404	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	1.185
Sum	86.000	Skewness	-0.307
Std Error	0.070	Maximum	2.000

CPCTPNPM Individuals' Perception of Command Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus Personnel and Navy Program Management

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	25	8.7	8.7	8.7
Higher	B	101	35.3	35.3	44.1
Equal	C	74	25.9	25.9	69.9
Higher	D	70	24.5	24.5	94.4
Significantly Higher	E	16	5.6	5.6	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 286 Missing Cases 0

Question #66

CPCTPNPM Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus PERSONNEL AND
NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.



Valid Cases 286 Missing Cases 0

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.171	Kurtosis	-0.809
Variance	1.146	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	1.071
Sum	49.000	Skewness	-0.191
Std Error	0.063	Maximum	2.000

CPCTSTK Individuals' Perception of Command Prior Comparison of Tactics Versus System Technical Knowledge

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	10	3.5	3.5	3.5
Higher	B	78	27.3	27.3	30.8
Equal	C	131	45.8	45.8	76.6
Higher	D	57	19.9	19.9	96.5
Significantly Higher	E	10	3.5	3.5	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 286 Missing Cases 0

Question #67

CPCTSTK Individual's perception of Command Priority. COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.



Valid Cases 286 Missing Cases 0

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.073	Kurtosis	-0.120
Variance	0.790	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.865
Sum	21.000	Skewness	-0.142
Std Error	0.051	Maximum	2.000

CPCTOPQ Individuals' Perception of Command Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	20	7.0	7.0	7.0
Higher	B	67	23.4	23.5	30.5
Equal	C	117	40.9	41.1	71.6
Higher	D	65	22.7	22.8	94.4
Significantly Higher	E	16	5.6	5.6	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid CAses 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #68

CPCTOPQ Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus OFFICER
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.035	Kurtosis	-0.340
Variance	0.0971	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.985
Sum	10.000	Skewness	0.018
Std Error	0.058	Maximum	2.000

CPCGAPNP Individuals' Perception of Command Priority, Comparison of General Admin Versus Personnel and Navy Program Management

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	11	3.8	3.8	3.8
Higher	B	83	29.0	29.0	32.9
Equal	C	95	33.2	33.2	66.1
Higher	D	89	31.1	31.1	97.2
Significantly Higher	E	8	2.8	2.8	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 286 Missing Cases 0

Question #69

CPCGAFNP Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus PERSONNELL
AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.



Valid Cases 286 Missing Cases 0

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.000	Kurtosis	-0.779
Variance	0.870	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.933
Sum	0.000	Skewness	0.078
Std Error	0.055	Maximum	2.000

CPCGASTK Individuals' Perception of Command Priority, Comparison of General Admin Versus System Technical Knowledge

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	14	4.9	4.9	4.9
Higher	B	75	26.2	26.3	31.2
Equal	C	48	16.8	16.8	48.1
Higher	D	130	45.5	45.6	93.7
Significantly Higher	E	18	6.3	6.3	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #70

CPCGASTK Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus SYSTEM
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.221	Kurtosis	-0.936
Variance	1.123	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	1.060
Sum	-63.000	Skewness	0.380
Std Error	0.063	Maximum	2.000

CPCGAOPQ Individuals' Perception of Command Priority
Conparison of General Admin Versus Officer
Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	11	3.8	3.9	3.9
Higher	B	76	26.6	26.7	30.5
Equal	C	73	25.5	25.6	56.1
Higher	D	103	36.0	36.1	92.3
Significantly Higher	E	22	7.7	7.7	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #71

CPCGAOPQ Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus OFFICER
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.172	Kurtosis	-0.870
Variance	1.065	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	1.032
Sum	-49.000	Skewness	0.137
Std Error	0.061	Maximum	2.000

QUESTION 72

CPCPNPST Individuals' Perception of Command Priority
Comparison of Personnel and Navy Programs
Management Versus System Technical Knowledge

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	12	4.2	4.2	4.2
Higher	B	76	26.6	26.7	30.9
Equal	C	73	25.5	25.6	56.5
Higher	D	106	37.1	37.2	93.7
Significantly Higher	E	18	6.3	6.3	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #72

CPCPNPST Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT versus SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.147	Kurtosis	-0.861
Variance	1.042	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	1.021
Sum	-42.000	Skewness	0.179
Std Error	0.060	Maximum	2.000

CPCPNPOP Individuals' Perception of Command Priority, Comparison of Personnel and Navy Programs Management Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Higher	B	72	25.2	25.3	28.1
Equal	C	92	32.2	32.3	60.4
Higher	D	99	34.6	34.7	95.1
Significantly Higher	E	14	4.9	4.9	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #73

CPCPNPOP Individual's perception of Command Priority. COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS MANAGEMENT versus OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.137	Kurtosis	-0.730
Variance	0.893	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.945
Sum	-39.000	Skewness	0.125
Std Error	0.056	Maximum	2.000

CPCSTKOP Individuals' Perception of Command Priority, Comparison of System Technical Knowledge Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Higher	B	78	27.3	27.4	30.2
Equal	C	118	41.3	41.4	71.6
Higher	D	73	25.5	25.6	97.2
Significantly Higher	E	8	2.8	2.8	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #74

CPCSTKOP Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE versus
OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.018	Kurtosis	-0.476
Variance	0.757	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.870
Sum	5.000	Skewness	-0.034
Std Error	0.052	Maximum	2.000

NPCTGA Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus General Admin

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	23	8.0	8.1	8.1
Higher	B	85	29.7	29.8	37.9
Equal	C	39	13.6	13.7	51.6
Higher	D	111	38.8	38.9	90.5
Significantly Higher	E	27	9.4	9.5	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #75

NPCTGA Individual's perception of Navy Priority., COMPARISON OF TACTICS versus GENERAL ADMIN.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.119	Kurtosis	-1.140
Variance	1.380	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	1.175
Sum	-34.000	Skewness	0.181
Std Error	0.070	Maximum	2.000

NPCTPNPM Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus Personnel and Navy Program Management

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	10	3.5	3.5	3.5
Higher	B	58	20.3	20.4	23.9
Equal	C	61	21.3	21.4	45.3
Higher	D	128	44.8	44.9	90.2
Significantly Higher	E	28	9.8	9.8	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #76

NPCTPNPM Individual's perception of Navy Priority.
COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus PERSONNEL AND
NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.372	Kurtosis	-0.625
Variance	1.051	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	1.025
Sum	-106.000	Skewness	0.440
Std Error	0.061	Maximum	2.000

NPCTSTK Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus System Technical Knowledge

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	5	1.7	1.8	1.8
Higher	B	59	20.6	20.7	22.5
Equal	C	133	46.5	46.7	69.1
Higher	D	81	28.3	28.4	97.5
Significantly Higher	E	7	2.4	2.5	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #77

NPCTSTK Individual's perception of Navy Priority. COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus SYSTEMCAL TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.091	Kurtosis	-0.275
Variance	0.654	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.808
Sum	-26.000	Skewness	0.087
Std Error	0.048	Maximum	2.000

NPCTOPQ Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	6	2.1	2.1	2.1
Higher	B	61	21.3	21.4	23.5
Equal	C	92	32.2	32.3	55.8
Higher	D	110	38.5	38.6	94.4
Significantly Higher	E	16	5.6	5.6	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #78

NPCTOPQ Individual's perception of Navy Priority. COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.242	Kurtosis	-0.630
Variance	0.853	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.924
Sum	-69.000	Skewness	0.230
Std Error	0.055	Maximum	2.000

NPCGAPNP Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of General Admin Versus Personnel and Navy Program Management

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	10	3.5	3.5	3.5
Higher	B	66	23.1	23.2	26.7
Equal	C	95	33.2	33.3	60.0
Higher	D	103	36.0	36.1	96.1
Significantly Higher	E	11	3.8	3.9	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #79

NPCGAPNP Individual's perception of Navy Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus PERSONNELL
AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.137	Kurtosis	-0.627
Variance	0.872	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.934
Sum	-39.000	Skewness	0.250
Std Error	0.055	Maximum	2.000

NPCGASTK Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of General Admin Versus System Technical Knowledge

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	18	6.3	6.3	6.3
Higher	B	106	37.1	37.2	43.5
Equal	C	52	18.2	18.2	61.8
Higher	D	102	35.7	35.8	97.5
Significantly Higher	E	7	2.4	2.5	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #80

NPCGASTK Individual's perception of Navy Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus SYSTEM
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.

```
CODE
     I
A    ****** (18)     (General Admin)
     I
     I
B    ***************************** (106)
     I
     I
C    ************** (52)
     I
     I
D    ************************** (102)
     I
     I
E    *** (7)     (System Technical Knowledge)
     I
     I
     I.........I.........I.........I.........I.........I.........I
     0         40        80        120       160       200
     FREQUENCY
```

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1
CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.091	Kurtosis	-1.201
Variance	1.076	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	1.037
Sum	26.000	Skewness	0.026
Std Error	0.061	Maximum	2.000

NPCGAOPQ Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of General Admin Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	15	5.2	5.3	5.3
Higher	B	89	31.1	31.2	36.5
Equal	C	71	24.8	24.9	61.4
Higher	D	101	35.3	35.4	96.8
Significantly Higher	E	9	3.1	3.2	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #81

NPCGAOPQ Individual's perception of Navy Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus OFFICER
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.000	Kurtosis	-0.996
Variance	1.007	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	1.004
Sum	0.000	Skewness	0.126
Std Error	0.059	Maximum	2.000

NPCPNPST Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of Personnel and Navy Programs Management Versus System Technical Knowledge

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	20	7.0	7.0	7.0
Higher	B	114	39.9	40.0	47.0
Equal	C	79	27.6	27.7	74.7
Higher	D	64	22.4	22.5	97.2
Significantly Higher	E	8	2.8	2.8	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #82

NPCPNPST Individual's perception of Navy Priority.
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT versus SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.260	Kurtosis	-0.707
Variance	0.953	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.976
Sum	74.000	Skewness	-0.266
Std Error	0.058	Maximum	2.000

NPCPNPOP Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of Personnel and Navy Programs Management Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	14	4.9	4.9	4.9
Higher	B	113	39.5	39.6	44.6
Equal	C	86	30.1	30.2	74.7
Higher	D	65	22.7	22.8	97.5
Significantly Higher	E	7	2.4	2.5	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #83

NPCPNPOP Individual's perception of Navy Priority.
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT versus OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.218	Kurtosis	-0.707
Variance	0.875	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.935
Sum	62.000	Skewness	-0.265
Std Error	0.055	Maximum	2.000

NPCSTKOP Individuals' Perception of Navy Priority, Comparison of System Technical Knowledge Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	2	0.7	0.7	0.7
Higher	B	79	27.6	27.7	28.4
Equal	C	135	47.2	47.4	75.8
Higher	D	62	21.7	21.8	97.5
Significantly Higher	E	7	2.4	2.5	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #84

NPCSTKOP Individual's perception of Navy Priority.
COMPARISION OF SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE versus
OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.025	Kurtosis	-0.361
Variance	0.623	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.789
Sum	7.000	Skewness	-0.260
Std Error	0.047	Maximum	2.000

IPCTGA Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus General Admin

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	112	39.2	39.4	39.4
Higher	B	140	49.0	49.3	88.7
Equal	C	21	7.3	7.4	96.1
Higher	D	7	2.4	2.5	98.6
Significantly Higher	E	4	1.4	1.4	100.0
	&	2	0.7	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 284 Missing Cases 2

Question #85

IPCTGA Individual's perception of Individual Priority.
COMPARISON OF TACTICS versus GENERAL ADMIN.



Valid Cases 284 Missing Cases 2

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	1.229	Kurtosis	3.028
Variance	0.644	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.802
Sum	349.000	Skewness	-1.389
Std Error	0.048	Maximum	2.000

IPCTPNPM Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus Personnel and Navy Program Management

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	66	23.1	23.2	23.2
Higher	B	137	47.9	48.2	71.5
Equal	C	65	22.7	22.9	94.4
Higher	D	13	4.5	4.6	98.9
Significantly Higher	E	3	1.0	1.1	100.0
	&	2	0.7	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 284 Missing Cases 2

Question #86

IPCTPNPM Individual's perception of Individual Priority. COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.



Valid Cases 284 Missing Cases 2

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.880	Kurtosis	0.456
Variance	0.728	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.853
Sum	250.000	Skewness	-.1.389
Std Error	0.051	Maximum	2.000

IPCTSTK Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus System Technical Knowledge

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	15	5.2	5.3	5.3
Higher	B	75	26.2	26.5	31.8
Equal	C	175	61.2	61.8	93.6
Higher	D	13	4.5	4.6	98.2
Significantly Higher	E	5	1.7	1.8	100.0
	&	3	1.0	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 283 Missing Cases 3

Question #87

IPCTSTK Individual's perception of Individual Priority. COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.



Valid Cases 283 Missing Cases 3

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.290	Kurtosis	1.427
Variance	0.511	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.715
Sum	82.000	Skewness	0.095
Std Error	0.043	Maximum	2.000

IPCTOPQ Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of Tactics Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	15	5.2	5.3	5.3
Higher	B	83	29.0	29.3	34.6
Equal	C	145	50.7	51.2	85.9
Higher	D	35	12.2	12.4	98.2
Significantly Higher	E	5	1.7	1.8	100.0
	&	3	1.0	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 283 Missing Cases 3

Question #88

IPCTOPQ Individual's perception of Individual Priority. COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 283 Missing Cases 3

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	0.240	Kurtosis	0.291
Variance	0.644	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.803
Sum	68.000	Skewness	-0.047
Std Error	0.048	Maximum	2.000

IPCGAPNP Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of General Admin Versus Personnel and Navy Program Management

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	7	2.4	2.5	2.5
Higher	B	32	11.2	11.3	13.8
Equal	C	129	45.1	45.6	59.4
Higher	D	102	35.7	36.0	95.4
Significantly Higher	E	13	4.5	4.6	100.0
	&	3	1.0	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 283 Missing Cases 3

Question #89

IPCGAPNP Individual's perception of Individual Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus PERSONNELL
AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.



Valid Cases 283 Missing Cases 3

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.290	Kurtosis	0.303
Variance	0.675	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.821
Sum	-82.000	Skewness	0.350
Std Error	0.049	Maximum	2.000

IPCGASTK Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of General Admin Versus System Technical Knowledge

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	3	1.0	1.1	1.1
Higher	B	15	5.2	5.3	6.3
Equal	C	34	11.9	11.9	18.2
Higher	D	192	67.1	67.4	85.6
Significantly Higher	E	41	14.3	14.4	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #90

IPCGASTK Individual's perception of Individual Priority. COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.888	Kurtosis	2.551
Variance	0.558	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.747
Sum	-253.000	Skewness	1.194
Std Error	0.044	Maximum	2.000

IPCGAOPQ Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of General Admin Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	1	0.3	0.4	0.4
Higher	B	12	4.2	4.2	4.6
Equal	C	54	18.9	18.9	23.5
Higher	D	180	62.9	63.2	86.7
Significantly Higher	E	38	13.3	13.3	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #91

IPCGAOPQ Individual's perception of Individual Priority. COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.849	Kurtosis	1.267
Variance	0.502	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.708
Sum	-242.000	Skewness	0.733
Std Error	0.042	Maximum	2.000

IPCPNPST Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of Personnel and Navy Programs Management Versus System Technical Knowledge

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	3	1.0	1.1	1.1
Higher	B	28	9.8	9.8	10.9
Equal	C	79	27.6	27.7	38.6
Higher	D	147	51.4	51.6	90.2
Significantly Higher	E	28	9.8	9.8	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #92

IPCPNPST Individual's perception of Individual Priority.
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT versus SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.593	Kurtosis	0.194
Variance	0.700	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.837
Sum	-169.000	Skewness	0.570
Std Error	0.050	Maximum	2.000

IPCPNPOP Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of Personnel and Navy Programs Management Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	1	0.3	0.4	0.4
Higher	B	20	7.0	7.0	7.4
Equal	C	105	36.7	36.8	44.2
Higher	D	137	47.9	48.1	92.3
Significantly Higher	E	22	7.7	7.7	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #93

IPCPNPOP Individual's perception of Individual Priority. COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS MANAGEMENT versus OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.558	Kurtosis	0.029
Variance	0.564	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.751
Sum	-159.000	Skewness	0.274
Std Error	0.045	Maximum	2.000

IPCSTKOP Individuals' Perception of Individual Priority, Comparison of System Technical Knowledge Versus Officer Professional Qualifications

Category Label	Code	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency Percent	Adjusted Frequency Percent	Cumulative Frequency Percent
Significantly Higher	A	7	2.4	2.5	2.5
Higher	B	50	17.5	17.5	20.0
Equal	C	169	59.1	59.3	79.3
Higher	D	53	18.5	18.6	97.9
Significantly Higher	E	6	2.1	2.1	100.0
	&	1	0.3	Missing	100.0
	Total	286	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

Question #94

IPCSTKOP Individual's perception of Individual Priority.
COMPARISION OF SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE versus
OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.



Valid Cases 285 Missing Cases 1

CODE ..... A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = Equal
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher

Mean	-0.004	Kurtosis	0.724
Variance	0.546	Minimum	-2.000
Range	4.000	Std Deviation	0.739
Sum	-1.000	Skewness	0.058
Std Error	0.044	Maximum	2.000

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